United States v. Rogers, 714 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2013)

Metadata:

Date of Decision: 30 April 2013.
Vote: 3-0
Author: Stahl, J.
Other Panelists: Lynch, C.J., and Thompson, J.
Ruling Below:
Subsequent Proceedings: Petition for certiorari filed 24 June 2013.

Facts:

Defendant Brian Rogers and his then-wife Heather sold two laptop computers to a pawn shop. During the reformatting process of defendant’s computer, the pawnshop’s computer technician observed videos of young children engaged in sexually explicit acts. The Brunswick, ME police were notified, and a few days later, collected the laptop from the pawnshop.

A forensic examination revealed both images and videos of CP in various locations on the laptop hard drive, including a Limewire “Shared” folder, the Internet cache, and in “lost files” folders. An examination of defendant’s Internet history, cookies, and bookmarks found entries with names suggesting CP. Defendant was indicted by a grand jury of one count of possessing CP in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A). A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 60 months and 8 years supervised release. Rogers was also ordered to pay restitution of $3,150 to “Vicky,” an identified CP victim.

Issues:

A) Whether the government proved that Rogers “knowingly possessed” the CP images on the laptop sold to the pawn shop; and

B) Whether the government established a causal connection between Rogers’ behavior and the alleged harm to “Vicky.”

Rules:

A) To show “knowing possession,” the government must show that the defendant possessed, and knew that he possessed CP.

B) The 1st Circuit looks at three issues related to restitution: “(1) whether someone is a victim of a child pornography offense; (2) what causation requirement applies to identify the compensable losses suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; and (3) what amount of restitution is reasonable.” See United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 185 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2013). Along with other circuits, the 1st Circuit has elected to apply a proximate causation standard.

Analysis:

A) The evidence from the Defendant’s Internet history made it clear that the CP on the laptop was downloaded intentionally. The cache contained the names of numerous Web sites suggestive of CP. The fact that the defendant bookmarked some of the sites suggests a “deliberate” interest.

The court rejected defendant’s claim that malware was responsible for the CP on the laptop, noting that a forensic test of the viruses found on defendant’s laptop did not result in any CP being downloaded onto a law enforcement computer. CP was found on a desktop computer as well, making it less likely that the contraband on the laptop was obtained accidentally. And finally, the court noted that some of the contraband images on the laptop were located in the Recycle Bin, indicating that defendant tried to delete them (and thus was aware that they had been downloaded).

The court then considered whether the government had proved that the defendant was the person who downloaded the content. It concluded that the government had successfully linked the user account on the laptop to defendant; among other things, defendant provided the password for the account to the pawn shop technician, and used the same ID on other Web sites. There was no evidence to support defendant’s claim that his ex-wife was responsible for downloading the CP. Based on the evidence presented, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant was the one who downloaded the CP.

B) A District Court’s ruling on restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with legal issues being considered de novo and findings of fact for clear error. The materials submitted by Vickey “amply established ‘that Vicky has suffered immensely . . . from the continued dissemination and viewing of’ material depicting her abuse,” quoting United States v. Kearney672 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 185 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2013).

In light of the fact that the underlying crime and restitution materials of this case are essential identical to Kearney, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order restitution of $3,150, an amount slightly less than the Kearney court assessed.

Holding:

The defendant’s conviction and the restitution order are affirmed.


United States v. Kornhauser, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 5968 (2d Cir. 2013)

* Unpublished *

Metadata:

Date of Decision: 26 March 2013
Vote: 3-0
Author: Summary Opinion
Panelists: Walker, J., Wesley, J., and Droney, J.
Ruling Below: Consolidated appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J. and Preska, C.J.). [Not Reported]
Subsequent Proceedings:

Facts:

[Editor’s Note: In lieu of a written decision by the District Court or a recitation by the Court of Appeals, the following facts are taken from the Government’s Sentencing Submission, filed 7 December 2011]

Kornhauser was on supervised release following a tax fraud conviction, and a search was conducted of his apartment pursuant to a condition of his release. During the search, officers observed a computer next to his bed and clicked on the “Favorites” tab of Internet Explorer. Instead of names, the bookmarks consisted of Roman numerals. When the officer clicked on several of the bookmarks, he immediately observed images of child pornography. The computer and a CD labeled “Back-up” were seized.

A forensics examination of the computer revealed that more than 700 images of child pornography had been deleted from the Internet cache of the computer, but had not yet been overwritten. The investigator also observed that Kornhauser had installed the program CleanUp!, and that it had been run shortly before the probation officers arrived for their inspection. The CD contained a copy of the “Favorites” bookmarks from Internet Explorer.

A grand jury indicted Kornhauser on 18 August 2010, charging him “unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly possessing (Count One) and receiving (Count Two) child pornography that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(a)(2)(A). After trial, he was convicted by a jury on both counts on 4 November 2010.

Issue:

Kornhauser raised four issues on appeal:

A) The trial court erred by allowing the government to show images of alleged CP to the jury, despite Kornhauser’s contention that there was no dispute as to the nature of the images. Kornhauser argued that the display was unduly prejudicial.

B) The trial court refused to allow Kornhauser to testify about an uncle’s “history of problem[atic] sexual behavior,” which Kornhauser claims would support his argument that the uncle downloaded the CP to the computer.

C) The trial court rejected Kornhauser’s preferred jury instruction.

D) The evidence was insufficient to support conviction.

Rule / Analysis:

A) In other cases, the 2d Circuit has endorsed the admission of CP images even when a defendant has stipulated as to their nature. See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 152-153 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, the trial court assessed whether the probative value of the images was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect, and was justified in admitting them.

B) Evidence of a third party’s alleged guilt for the alleged offense(s) “may be excluded where it … is speculative or remote” as the charged crime(s). Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006). Here, the trial court was within its discretion to reject Kornhauser’s proffered testimony, given the risk of undue jury confusion and lack of relevance.

C) When challenging a trial court’s jury instruction, a defendant “‘must show that his proposed charge accurately represented the law in every respect, and that the charge actually given, viewed as a whole, prejudiced him.'” United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2000)). In this case, the district court’s instructions clearly explained to the jury that the government was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant. . . was aware that he had received or attempted to receive the visual depiction that constitutes child pornography.” Kornhauser was not prejudiced by the instructions.

D) Automatic downloading of CP images to an Internet cache can constitute “knowing receipt” where a defendant demonstrates an awareness of the likelihood that CP was downloaded by attempting to delete the Internet cache.  United States v. Ramos, 685 F.3d 120, 132 (2d Cir. 2012). Given that Kornhauser viewed over 700 CP images, and installed a program to regularly sweep his cache, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that he had “knowingly” received CP on his computer.

Holding:

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.


United States v. Genin, 594 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

Metadata:

Date of Decision: 26 January 2009
Author: Robinson, D.J.
Subsequent Proceedings: United States v. Genin, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9217 (2d Cir. 2013)

Facts:

[Note: The District Court drew the following facts from an affidavit of FBI Special Agent Stephen Tortorella, filed in support of his application for a search warrant for Genin’s apartment.]

In 2006, Italian investigators arrested a man who operated two Web sites, youngvideomodels.net and youngvideomodels.com, that offered DVDs and downloadable content containing child pornography. Following his arrest, the site operator provided investigators with a list of e-mail addresses of individuals who had purchased content from his sites.

The content was distributed in one of two ways: either by delivery of a DVD to the customer by mail, or by sending the customer a temporary link to the purchased content and a password to gain access. Customers paid for the content by sending funds to the site operator by mail, by credit card, or through various online payment systems.

According to a Europol report (as summarized by the FBI), all of the individuals depicted in the Web site video were between the ages of 8 and 16. The FBI summary reported that “in some of the videos, the minors are depicted engaging in sexual acts, such as actual or simulated masturbation, oral sex, or simulated vaginal sex with adults or each other.” It also stated that “many of the videos, the minors are dressed in ‘string’ lingerie or are completely nude, and are posed such that their genitals are the focus of the image.”

In the spring of 2007, Europol provided the FBI with a hard drive containing approximately 150 movies seized from the Web sites. The movies were reviewed by the FBI’s “Innocent Images Unit” (IIU), but not by Special Agent Tortorella. The affidavit prepared by Special Agent Tortorella does not identify the individual who reviewed the movies or his/her qualifications.

The IIU analyst agreed that the all of the seized videos depicted females under the age of 17, and some under the age of 10. The analyst stated that “nearly all of the minors appear nude or partially nude,” and that “in nearly all of the videos the minors are engaged in sexual acts, or are depicted with their legs spread, or the camera lens zoomed in close on their pubic region, thereby clearly exposing the minor’s genitals.”

in addition to the video summary, Agent Tortorella recounted the IIU summary of 15 e-mails sent from “hellmansmayo13@webtv.net” to the Web site operator. WebTV stated that the subscriber associated with that e-mail address was Richard Genin (the defendant). The e-mails, which were reproduced in Agent Tortorella’s affidavit, make multiple reference to videos depicting underage females. Agent Tortorella stated that the IIU analyst reviewed several of the videos specifically referenced in the e-mails and confirmed that the videos depicted child pornography. The user of the e-mail address “hellmansmayo13@webtv.net” told the Web site operator that his name was “Richard Genin” and provided the same address given to WebTV.

Based on Special Agent Tortorella’s affidavit, a search warrant was issued on 31 March 2008, and was executed the following day. The search uncovered receipts for Western Union money transfers to the Web site operator; a WebTV console; paperwork associated with the purchase of various videos; and a number of videos in VHS and DVD format. In a subsequent interview, Genin admitted using his WebTV console to purchase child pornography from numerous Web sites, including the sites at issue in this case. He was charged with one count of possession of child pornography.

Genin subsequently filed a pre-trial motion seeking suppression of certain physical evidence and his voluntary statements.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate erred in concluding that the representations in the affidavit of Special Agent Tortorella were sufficient to establish probable cause.

Genin argues that: 1) neither Special Agent Tortorella nor the magistrate actually reviewed the alleged contraband, and the expert upon whom the affidavit relies is completely unidentified; and 2) the information upon which the affidavit was based was stale (two years elapsed between Genin’s last e-mail to the Web site and the issuance of the warrant).

Rule:

1) Existence of Probable Cause: The magistrate’s ruling regarding probable cause “should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983). The role of the reviewing court is to make sure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for his or her ruling. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. At the same time, the reviewing court must not serve as a rubber stamp, and must determine whether the affidavit “provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and . . . wholly conclusory statement[s] . . . fail[] to meet this requirement.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.

A finding of probably cause is required by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Probable causes exists if, “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

Given the contents of the e-mails between Genin and the Web site operator, the magistrate was justified in concluding that the persons depicted in the videos were minors. However, the magistrate also needed to find probable cause that Genin possessed videos depicting sexually explicit activity or child pornography. Genin’s e-mails do not make reference to sexually explicit activity, nor do the descriptions provided by the IIU agent. Thus, the search warrant could only be justified if the videos met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v)–“lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.”

Due to the statute’s use of the word “lascivious,” that determination is inherently subjective. United States v. Battershell, 457 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). Since the term is not self-defining, “jurors (and judges) need neutral references and considerations to avoid decisions based on individual values or the revulsion potentially raised in a child pornography prosecution” based on lascivious depictions of minors. United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 252 (2d Cir. 2008). The District Court cited favorably to a number of decisions holding that a magistrate may not find probable cause for a suspect’s possession of a “lascivious” photo based merely on an agent’s conclusory statement. See, e.g., Battershell, 457 F.3d at 1051-53; United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 465-66 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17-19 (1st Cir. 2001).

2) Good Faith Exception: In the event that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, the government argues that the agents who executed the search warrant acted in good faith in doing so. “The Supreme Court has held that the ‘marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.'” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

Interpreting Leon, the 2d Circuit has held that an law enforcement agent acts in good faith unless one of four conditions is met: “(1) where the issuing [judge] has been knowingly misled; (2) where the issuing [judge] wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable; (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient [such as by failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized] that reliance upon it is unreasonable.” United States v. Falso, 544 F. 3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008).

Analysis:

1) Existence of Probable Cause: In the instant case, the affidavit does not contain a description of the specific videos discussed by Genin in his e-mails, nor were copies of (or images from) the videos attached as exhibits. The affidavit merely repeats the statement of the IIU agent that he viewed videos received by Genin and determined that they were child pornography. However, the IIU agent did not state which videos he viewed or the statutory basis for his conclusion.

Genin’s own descriptions in the videos are “sordid” and suggestive of lasciviousness, but in the end, are an insufficient basis for the magistrate to conclude that there was probable cause that Genin possessed child pornography. While it is a “close question,” the District Court concluded that Special Agent Tortorolla’s affidavit did not contain sufficient specific facts to support a finding of probable cause.

2) Good Faith Exception: Genin argued that under the third exception to Leon, the officers did not act in good faith. Specifically, he argues that “the warrant affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance on it was unreasonable.  He argues that the absence of any descriptions and reliance on an unidentified expert should have alerted law enforcement agents to the affidavit’s critical flaws.

The District Court disagreed. It noted that in the 2d Circuit, it is still “unclear” whether an affidavit must contain either contain detailed descriptions of alleged contraband or have copies attached as exhibits. See United States v. Jasorka, 153 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1998). Given that the absence of probable cause was a “close call,” reliance on the search warrant by law enforcement was “objectively reasonable.” However, the District Court noted that in the future, it would make a different determination if sufficient descriptions or attachments are not included.

Holding:

Genin’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search is denied. Since his motion to suppress his voluntary statements made during the search was based on his challenge to the search warrant, that motion is also denied.