United States v. Marandola, 489 Fed. Appx. 522 (2d Cir. 2013)

* Unpublished *

Metadata:

Date of Decision: 10 January 2013
Vote: 3-0
Author: Summary Opinion
Panelists: Jacobs, C.J., Pooler, J., and Chin, J.
Ruling Below: United States v. Marandola, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93875 (W.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2010) (Arcara, J.)
Subsequent Proceedings: None

Facts:

[From the District Court opinion] Defendant and his wife owned two computers, a Dell and an Apple G4, which were both purchased using joint marital funds. Defendant’s wife primarily used the Dell but would occasionally use the Apple to check e-mail.  The couple shared Internet access paid for by defendant’s wife, and sometime their 11-year-old daughter used the Apple computer. On February 28, 2008, defendant’s wife decided to use the Apple to pull up Mapquest for driving instructions. Defendant had renamed the system icons, making it hard for his wife to locate Internet Explorer. Instead, she used the Apple “recent applications” feature. When she did so, however, she saw several videos listed with names suggesting child pornography. She tried to view family photos on the Apple computer and saw images of child pornography interspersed. Many of the images depicted young girls who resembled the couple’s daughter.

Two days later, after consulting with family and friends, she called a sexual abuse hotline. Later that afternoon, detectives from the Lancaster Police Department came to the marital home and asked defendant’s wife for her consent to seize the computers and search them. She signed the consent form and later provided a statement regarding what she saw. A forensics examination of the Apple computer revealed multiple CP images and movies.

Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the search was denied by the District Court, and he was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He appealed.

Issue:

Whether Defendant’s wife had authority to grant third-party consent to a search of the Apple computer by law enforcement.

Rule:

A third party has actual authority to provide consent to search if “first, the third party had access to the area searched, and second, either: (a) common authority over the area; or (b) a substantial interest in the area; or (c) permission to gain access.” United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1992). Alternatively, the exception for consent extends to those situations where law enforcement officers reasonably — but erroneously — believe that the third-party has authority to grant consent. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006)

Analysis:

Under either rule, the search was valid. Based on the facts presented, defendant’s wife met all of the criteria for actual authority. The Apple computer was in the living room, to which defendant’s wife had access. Defendant’s wife had a substantial interest in the Apple computer (half of joint funds used to purchase it), and she paid for Internet access. She was never told she couldn’t use the Apple computer, and even though it was password-protected occasionally, it wasn’t on the day she discovered the CP.

Given the facts observed by the police officers, it was entirely reasonable for them to assume that defendant’s wife had authority to consent to a search.

Holding:

The District Court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.